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CONCEPTUALIZING THE URBAN COMMONS:  
THE PLACE OF BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS IN CITY GOVERNANCE1 
Dr. Alexandra Flynn, Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia 
Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) are self-taxed organizations that are comprised of 
businesses and property owners, are approved by city governments, and spend funds to improve 
profitability within certain neighbourhood boundaries. BID governance structures can also 
include neighbourhood residents and city councillors as voting or non-voting members. 
Numerous scholars have written about the role of BIDs in city governance, including the extent 
to which they improve or undermine inclusivity and accountability. This paper focuses on a 
related question that has not yet been deeply analysed in legal scholarship: can BIDs be 
considered a form of urban commons? The term ‘urban commons’ is contested, but generally 
refers to the application of the property law notion of the commons to the shared management of 
bounded city spaces. This paper extends from existing debates on the meaning of the “urban 
commons” and its application to BIDs. This paper uses BIDs in Toronto to introduce decision-
making, representation, and accountability as elements of just urban governance can serve as the 
basis of an evaluation of the urban commons.  
Introduction 
The word ‘city’ comes from the Latin cīvitās, meaning a highly organized community – 
something that has existed almost as long as human history.2 In the context of Ontario, Canada, 
the word ‘city’ is undefined in statutory terms: the most recent set of municipal statutes removed 
references to titles like ‘city,’ ‘town,’ and ‘village.’3 Generally, cities are nested within the 
jurisdiction of provincial, state, or federal governments that limit their authority, and are also 
understood as democratic governments that represent their residents.4 In addition to city councils 
that serve as the legislatures of decision-making, residents and businesses are also represented by 
associations that seek a decision-making role in local matters. One example is a Business 
1 I owe heaps of gratitude to the many people who provided valuable feedback on this draft, especially Amelia 
Thorpe, Sarah Hamill, Carol Rose, Mariana Valverde, Nicholas Blomley, and Doug Harris. Many thanks as well to 
the participants of the Celebrating Commons Conference at the Georgetown Law Centre in October 2018 and to the 
Property and the City Workshop at Allard School of Law in March 2017. All errors and omissions are my own. 
2 René Maunier, “The Definition of the City” (1910) 15:4 American Journal of Sociology 536; See also UN Habitat, 
2014. 
3 In Ontario, there are two principal pieces of legislation that determine the powers and obligations of local 
governments: City of Toronto Act, 2006. S.O. 2006, Ch. 11 [hereinafter “COTA”] applies exclusively to Toronto, 
while the Municipal Act, 2001, S.O. 2011, c. 25 applies to all other 444 municipalities.  
4 Ibid. at s. 1. 
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Improvement District (BID). In most cities, these are formed through a city bylaw that levies a 
tax on local businesses and property owners, which can amount to millions of dollars per year. 
BIDs can have a strong voice in local matters. As BIDs represent private interests, their role 
within city governance is uncertain. There is wide debate in the academic literature as to whether 
they are lobbyists for businesses, enablers of local action, or a part of a broader local governance 
network. Depending on which of these roles they serve, the existence and oversight of BIDs raise 
important questions about whose interests are given priority in city governance.  
 
The term ‘urban commons’ has no uniform definition or agreed upon principles, and is used in a 
wide range of disciplines.5 The city is an especially interesting setting for commons debates, as it 
is “not a frictionless agglomeration of commoners, but rather a site for ongoing contestation 
about what counts as a common and who counts as commoners.”6 Its theoretical meaning 
emerged from a form of property interest called ‘common property,’ whereby land or resources 
are owned, and therefore managed, together with others, rather than having a single owner. 
Emerging scholarship is examining the use of the ‘urban commons’ as a theoretical tool to 
advance the notion of the ‘just city.’ Most of this scholarship is grounded within the social 
sciences, often connecting the urban commons to movements for greater public involvement in 
decision-making, whereas in law, the commons is often explored as a kind of property interest. 
The urban commons advances that, regardless of whether spaces are privately or publicly owned, 
the city is a territorial space in which citizens claim to have a role or stake, a norm which is 
reinforced in law.7 At the same time, scholars have observed that creating neighbourhood 
boundaries and enabling localized power can also lead to “insiders” and “outsider” and 
disproportionately impacts racialized, low-income people.8  In recent scholarship, notions of the 
commons have been applied to discussions of the environment, communications, the rights of the 
homeless, among others.9 The conversation about the urban commons is central to situations 
                                                        
5 Maja Hojer Braun, “Communities and the commons” in Christian Borch and Martin Kornberger, eds., Urban 
Commons: Rethinking the City (Routledge, 2015) at 154. 
6 Christian Borch & Martin Kornberger, Urban Commons: Rethinking the City (Routledge, 2015) at 15. 
7 Sheila Foster & Christian Iaione, "The City as a Commons" (2016) 34 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 281. 
8 See e.g. Ford, Richard Thompson.“The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis” (1994) 107 
Harv. L. Rev. 1843; Ford, Richard Thompson. “Law's Territory (A History of Jurisdiction)” (1999) 97 Mich. L. 
Rev. 843; and Frug, Gerald E. “The Geography of Community” (1996) 48 Stanford Law Review 1047. 
9 See e.g. Braun, supra note 5; Borch & Kornberger, supra note 6; and Foster & Iaione, supra note 7. 
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where multiple bodies claim to have rights to govern within an urban context, how such claims 
are mediated, and by whom.10  
 
BIDs are meant to represent the interests of local businesses and property owners, and have been 
critiqued as exacerbating space-based tensions, in particular in relation to historically 
disadvantaged residents.11 This article brings together these two rich scholarly conversations by 
examining the role that BIDs play in city governance and their relationship to the urban 
commons. Scholars from many disciplines have analysed BIDs in relation to governance and 
geography, often struggling with the self-interested and privileged focus of BIDs within the 
larger democratic agendas of city governments. Although they have not explored the relationship 
between BIDs and the urban commons, Sheila Foster and Christian Iaione drew upon Elinor 
Ostrom’s famous work Governing the Commons to note in passing how BIDs incorporate the 
design principles of the commons and inspire other creative conceptualizations of a commons 
framework in the urban context, leading to the promise of a more collaborative urban governance 
environment.12 Without delving deeply into the conceptualizing of BIDs alongside the urban 
commons, other scholars, including Elizabeth Blackmar and Sarah Hamill, have challenged the 
application of the idea of the commons to characterize all or part of city space.13  
 
This paper explores the tensions between conceptualizing BIDs as a tool for collaborative justice 
or, alternatively, as an exclusive interest group that is privileged within urban governance. The 
aim is not to set out a grand, generalized theory of BIDs and their place within the governance of 
cities, but rather to understand whether and how BIDs can be considered an example of the urban 
commons. It begins by summarizing the existing literature on the scope and meaning of the 
‘urban commons,’ including as a form of property interest and a political movement. What do we 
mean by the governance of the ‘urban commons,’ and how do BIDs fit into this scheme? Next, it 
                                                        
10 This is a different conception of the urban commons from Harvey (DATE), for example, who suggests that spaces 
become urban commons through social action. 
11 Gabriella Schaller & Susanna Modan, "Contesting Public Space and Citizenship Implications for Neighborhood 
Business Improvement Districts" (2005) 24:4 Journal of Planning Education and Research 394. 
12 Foster & Iaione, supra note 7. 
13 Elizabeth Blackmar, “Appropriating ‘the Commons’: The Tragedy of Property Rights Discourse” in Low, S., and 
N. Smith, The Politics of Public Space (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2006) at 49-80 (examining how the language 
of property rights has shaped the kinds of claims that are made on and about public property, leading to the opening 
and closing of democratic public space); Sarah Hamill, “Private Rights to Common Property: The Evolution of 
Common Property in Canada” (2012) 58:2 McGill Law Journal 365. 
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uses examples from the city of Toronto, the first municipality to introduce BIDs as a form of 
local representation, to explore the existing legal framework of BIDs. Can they can be 
considered a form of urban commons?  Specifically, it explores how an analysis that focuses on 
decision-making, representation, and accountability as elements of just urban governance can 
serve as the basis of an evaluation of the urban commons This paper also applies normative 
characteristics to evaluate claims about the commons. Can the language of the ‘urban commons’ 
be used to understand BIDs, or does Foster and Iaione’s call for “visible, equal, contestable, and 
legitimate” decision-making render this characterization theoretically problematic? How is the 
language of the urban commons used in overlapping claims in city governance? By exploring 
these issues, this paper helps clarify  how dominant groups leverage and rely on state power to 
further their economic interests.   
 
Conceptualizing the Urban Commons 
 
Scholars have explored the meaning of the commons and its implications to urban centres in 
various ways, but generally all refer to Garrett Hardin and Elinor Ostrom, the grandparents of 
contemporary notions of the commons. Hardin, a biologist, claimed that the commons is an 
unsatisfactory form of property interest: individual parties do not have a vested interest to 
conserve or sustainably use the resource, which inevitably leads to depletion and destruction.14 
Hardin ominously called this the ‘tragedy of the commons.’15 Free-riders will take advantage of 
the public nature of the good or land: because there are no consequences to this abuse, the 
common property will ultimately fall into disrepair. Elinor Ostrom later critiqued his claims on, 
among other reasons, the basis of governance.16 She asserted that a commons is not solely a 
single resource, as Hardin saw it. She argued that it is a resource plus the social community and 
its corresponding values, rules, and norms that are used to manage or govern the resource. In her 
book, Governing the Commons, for which she won the Nobel Prize in 1999, Ostrom offered real-
world examples of the management of common goods such as fisheries, land irrigation systems, 
                                                        
14 Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons” (1968) 162 Science 1243 at 1244. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge 
University Press, 1990). See also Lee Anne Fennell, Ostrom’s Law: Property Rights in the Commons (2011) 5:1 
Int’l J of the Commons 9, online: < http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/SSRN-id1962336.pdf>. 
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and farmlands.17 She argued that the tragedy of the commons could be solved, and identified a 
number of factors conducive to successful resource management: first, the resource should have 
definable boundaries; second, there must be a perceptible threat of resource depletion and it must 
be difficult to find substitutes; third, the presence of small and stable populations with a strong 
social network and social norms promoting conservation; and fourth, appropriate community-
based rules and procedures in place with built-in incentives for responsible use and punishments 
for overuse.18 These factors were later used in evaluating the commons as applied to cities.19 
 
The commons and the city 
 
A discussion of an urban commons first requires situating the city. Saskia Sassen described the 
large, complex city as “a new frontier zone.”20 She wrote, “Access to the city is no longer simply 
a matter of having or not having power. Urban spaces have become hybrid bases from which to 
act” through robust governance structures.21 Legal authority and governance structures are 
critical to action.22 As Canadian legal scholar Hoi Kong wrote, “Cities can be many things, but 
they are necessarily creations of the law.”23 Law is key to governance, in that it shapes the 
microspaces and bodies within the complex city that play a role in local and city-wide decision-
making.24 The law serves a critical role in empowering people and communities within an urban 
space to engage and act.  
 
The language of the urban commons invokes property law.25 Many property scholars would 
agree that formal law (meaning that expressed in codes and on paper) is inadequate in capturing 
                                                        
17 Elinor Ostrom, James Walker, & Roy Gardner, "Covenants With and Without a Sword: Self-Governance Is 
Possible" (1992) 86:2 American Political Science Review 404 
18 Ibid. 
19 Foster & Iaione, supra note 7. 
20 Saskia Sassen, Cities in a World Economy (Pine Forge Press, 2012) at 86. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ester Fuchs, “Governing the Twenty-First Century City” (2012) 65:2 Journal of International Affairs 43 at 45. 
23 Hoi Kong, “Toward a Federal Theory of the City” (2012) 56:3 McGill LJ 473 at 478. 
24 Ron Levi and Mariana Valverde, “Freedom of the City: Canadian Cities and the Quest for Governmental Status” 
(2006) 44:3 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 409. 
25 See esp Elizabeth Blackmar, supra note 13 at 49-80, who examines how the language of property rights has 
shaped the kinds of claims that are made on and about public property, leading to the opening and closing of 
democratic public space. 
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how communities form rights and interests in connection to land.26 Law school students are 
taught that property’s lineage, back to the origins of English common law, provides a stabilizing 
model upon which much of the legal system can be understood. Property courses typically begin 
by categorizing the world into four (sometimes overlapping) categories that more or less explain 
how title to land and goods can be understood: private, common, public, and non-property or 
open access.27 In this model, private property is owned by individuals who can exclude others 
from access. Common property is collectively owned, while public property is managed and 
controlled by government. The final category has no ownership and can be freely used by all. 
Hamill argued that these categories are “hopelessly inadequate for the real world.”28 Many other 
scholars have recently criticized what they consider an overly simplistic, strictly doctrinal 
understanding of property, which oversimplifies the idea of ‘owner’ and the many parties with 
legal and other interests in property,29 the link between belonging and property,30 whether 
property includes obligations to third-party non-interest holders,31 the transformative effects of 
environmental and indigenous law on property,32 who sets the agenda for private property,33 and 
the many communities who live on and put land to work without any desire to formalize their 
rights.34  
 
Common property presents a particular problem for traditional interpretations of property law.35 
Common property interests are shared among many users, without necessarily having divided 
lines, hierarchical interests, or the capacity to exclude, each of which feature in traditional 
                                                        
26 See e.g. Estair Van Wagner, “Putting Property in its Place: Relational Theory, Environmental Rights and Land 
Use Planning” (2015) Revue Générale De Droit 43; Sarah Keenan, Subversive Property: Law and the Production of 
Spaces of Belonging (Routledge, 2014); and Nicole Graham, Lawscape: Property, Environment, Law (Oxon: 
Routledge, 2011). 
27 Daniel H. Cole & Elinor Ostrom (eds.) Property in Land and Other Resources (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 
2012) at 42-43. 
28 Hamill, supra note 13 at 8. 
29 Van Wagner, supra note 26 at 275.  
30 Keenan, supra note 26. 
31 Christopher Essert, Property in Licences and the Law of Things (2014) 59:3 McGill LJ 559. 
32 Graham, supra note 26. 
33 Larissa Katz, “Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law” (2008) 58:3 University of Toronto Law Journal 275 at 
278. 
34 Nicholas Blomley, Unsettling the city: Urban land and the politics of property (Routledge: 2004) at 20; Daniel 
Fitzpatrick, “Fragmented Property Systems” (2017) 38:1 UPenn J Int’l L 137. 
35 Hamill, supra note 13. 
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conceptions of private property.36 But these divisions are neither neat, nor generalizable. Carol 
Rose, for example, disputed the characterization of common property as an inevitable tragedy, 
arguing instead that public property, which is both owned and managed by society at large, is 
better understood as a “comedy.”37 Law controls access of certain lands to the public, because 
“public access to those locations is as important as the general privatization of property in other 
spheres of our law.”38 In her comprehensive account, common property is crucial to protecting 
the interests of private property holders; it is not a separate binary. 
 
According to Foster and Iaione’s urban commons framework, regardless of whether spaces are 
privately or publicly owned, the city is a territorial space in which citizens have a role or stake, a 
norm which is reinforced in law.39 They built on Ostrom’s argument, which challenged the 
assumption that common property cannot be governed collectively without substantial waste and 
inefficiency to the urban form. In the context of the city, common pool resources are particular 
urban spaces, which then become sites of governance. Public–private organizations can work 
together to effectively play a role in governing specific city areas, but to do so they must 
incorporate ‘bottom-up’ governance. The city as commons is thus a system of governance over 
particular city spaces, which incorporates subsidiarity, or delegated authority, and polycentrism, 
meaning multiple parties are working together. 
 
Three key debates have emerged in conceptualizing the ‘urban commons.’ First, scholars have 
conceptualized the city as a whole an example of the commons, as well as micro-spaces within 
the urban commons, e.g., public streets, public parks, any public and neighbourhood amenities, 
and public spaces.40 Nicholas Blomley argued that an ‘urban commons’ includes community 
gardens, land trusts and squatting; he provided an example of a large private property 
development in downtown Vancouver that resulted in the eviction of a sizeable homeless 
                                                        
36 Elinor Ostrom, James Walker, & Roy Gardner, "Covenants With and Without a Sword: Self-Governance Is 
Possible" (1992) 86:2 American Political Science Review 404. 
37 Carol Rose, “The Comedy of the Commons: Commerce, Custom, and Inherently Public Property” (1986) 53 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 711 at 720. 
38 Ibid. at 781. 
39 Foster & Iaione, supra note 7. 
40 Ibid. Vinay Gidwani & Amita Baviskar, “Urban Commons” (2011) 46:50 Economic and Political Weekly 1 at 2, 
online: <http://environmentportal.in/files/file/Commons_1.pdf>. 
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population. 41 He recommended that the idea of the commons be reframed as a model that is not 
as “radically dissimilar from private property as one might suppose,”42 especially as the 
commons was historically considered exclusive under English law.43 He argued that property had 
political weight, providing individuals and groups in the city with a language for “naming, 
blaming and claiming.”44 From this perspective, it is possible to apply the idea of the urban 
commons – the weight of private property as crafted by city governments through the vehicle of 
law – to equally argue that non-property owners have a right to a parcel of land.45 Blomley 
wrote, “Not only does the making of property entail the making of space … but property’s 
enactments are also caught up in the creation of particular landscapes that are simultaneously 
material and representational.”46  
 
Second, scholars have debated whether the actual ownership of a resource, public or private, is 
relevant in the context of the urban commons or whether the focus should instead be placed on 
governance.47 Institutions are meant to protect and enhance shared resources in a city,48 and land 
use regulations are seen as a way to improve utility or value within an urban landscape. To some 
scholars, the city government is the appropriate decision-maker.49 Foster and Iaione argued that 
if local government does not manage the urban commons appropriately for whatever reason, 
“regulatory slippage” can occur, whereby the common resource is degraded in value or 
attractiveness for other types of users and uses.50 They continued that at this point, the space in 
question “creates conditions which begin to mimic the type of commons problem that Hardin 
wrote about—that is, such resources become rivalrous and prone to degradation and perhaps 
                                                        
41 Nicholas Blomley, “Enclosure, common right, and the property of the poor” (2008) 17 Social and Legal Studies 
311 at 318. 
42 Ibid at 154.  
43 Briony McDonagh & Carl J Griffin, ‘Occupy! Historical geographies of property, protest and the commons, 1500-
1850’ (2016) 53 J Hist Geog 1. 
44 Blomley, supra note 38 at 154. 
45 Hamill, supra note 13.  
46 Nicholas Blomley, "Un-real Estate: Proprietary Space and Public Gardening" (2004) 36:4 Antipode 614 at xvi. 
47 Foster and Iaione, supra note 7. 
48 Tara Lynne Clapp & Peter B Meyer, "Managing the Urban Commons: Applying Common Property Frameworks 
to Urban Environmental Quality" (May 31-June 4, 2000) Constituting the Commons: Crafting Sustainable 
Commons in the New Millennium, the Eighth Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of 
Common Property 1 at 1-2, online: <dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/handle/10535/1963>. 
49 Foster and Iaione, supra note 7 at 298. 
50 Ibid. 
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destruction.”51 The openness of many cityscapes yields social benefits but quickly mimics the 
conditions of a common pool resource of overuse in either volume or intensity. Put simply, the 
‘common pool resource’ of the city may be owned by a variety of actors, with the governance of 
these actors as the more relevant discourse in a commons analysis.52 
 
A third debate centres on how the interests of third parties are mediated.53 There are more than 
two possible choices in maintaining the urban commons, not just government centralized 
regulation or privatization. There are alternative avenues for decision-making and management 
of the urban commons, such as those used for cooperative natural resource management 
regimes.54 From this perspective, the city government may not act as an appropriate steward of 
city space, so some other form of governance can and should be invoked to limit the degradation 
of city resources. This is sometimes called ‘bottom up governance’ – making room for co-
partners, or co-collaborators who use and have a stake in the commons.55 In other words, urban 
commons can be conceived as spaces with shared access to local resources for residents with a 
common stake in ensuring the longevity of a resource: a commons governance model that 
includes non-government actors can protect the ‘common good.’56 For example, non-state actors 
can get involved in a governance model when governments are too strained to address a broader 
range of city issues.57 Clapp and Meyer use the commons framework to describe the governance 
practices of institutional actors with regard to the environment.58 They questioned the ability of 
city governments to limit environmental depletion, due to existing municipal institutions of 
varying scales, regulatory structures, land markets, and state and local government policies and 
regulations. They argued that to ensure distributional equity, municipal institutions should allow 
communities to protect themselves from harm through the establishment of shared cooperative 
normative structures. In this way, governance beyond the state achieves a degree of fairness that 
is otherwise not possible.59  
                                                        
51 Ibid. 
52 Similarly, recent property law scholarship as reoriented governance or “agenda setting” as a crucial question in 
understanding “ownership.” See e.g. Larissa Katz, supra note 28. 
53 Foster & Iaione, supra note 7. 
54 Rose, supra note 37 at 721. 
55 Foster, supra note 7 at 57. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Clapp & Meyer, supra note 48. 
59 Ibid at 133. 
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These debates, although important and different from one another, each frame the urban 
commons as a model of collaborative governance. Whether the space is part or all of the city, 
and regardless of ownership, the government and third parties interact in the management of the 
resource. Scholars are torn with regard to the extent to which cooperative management is 
facilitated by a strict centralized government action versus privatized actions.60 For example, 
Foster argued that the state needs to create “the conditions under which citizens can develop 
collaborative relationships with each other” and cooperate together and with public authorities.61 
Are BIDs an example of an urban commons?  
 
What is a Business Improvement District? 
 
BIDs are self-taxed organizations that operate at the local level. They complicate notions of the 
urban commons. On one hand, they participate in governance in particular areas of the city as 
independent third parties. On the other hand, they are part of a city’s local governance 
framework and are accountable to the city and the public.62 Despite the emergence of these 
organizations internationally, no naming conventions or definitions have been standardized,63 but 
BID is one common term.64 A BID generally has three features: first, it provides a specific set of 
powers to business and property owners to achieve their mandate, most notably an organizational 
structure and direct access to the local councillors who serve on their boards. Second, it is funded 
through a required levy against local property owners or businesses, which functions as a form of 
taxation. Local businesses cannot back out of paying even if they voted against forming a BID or 
                                                        
60 Nicole Stelle Garnett, "Managing the Urban Commons" (2012) 160:7 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
1995. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Peter Parker & Staffan Schmidt, "Commons-based governance in public space: user participation and inclusion", 
online: <https://dspace.mah.se/bitstream/handle/2043/20741/Commons-
based%20governance%20in%20public%20space.pdf?sequence=2>. 
63 Lorlene Hoyt & Devika Gopal-Agge, "The Business Improvement District Model: A Balanced Review of 
Contemporary Debates" (2007) Geography Compass 1/4 946. 
64 Elisabeth Peyroux, Robert Pütz & Georg Glasze, "Business Improvement Districts (BIDs): The 
internationalization and contextualization of a 'travelling concept'" (2012) 19:2 European Urban and Regional 
Studies 111 at 118. I use the term “BID” where referenced in the original text. 
  11 
disagree with its activities. Third, it supplements public services offered by the City, which more 
broadly defines their entrenched governance role.65  
 
The first BID worldwide was established in Toronto in 1970, and was called a “business 
improvement area.” Toronto defines a business improvement areas as an association comprised 
of commercial and industrial property owners and business tenants within a specified geographic 
area district, which is officially approved by the City to stimulate business and improve 
economic vitality.66 In the late 1960s, a small group of business leaders wanted to create a form 
of business association that would circumvent the ‘free-rider problem,’ whereby improvements 
by a small set of business owners would also advantage those who did not pay or otherwise 
contribute. They created an independent, privately managed organization with the power to 
impose an additional tax on all commercial property owners in the area to be directed to local 
revitalization initiatives, regardless of whether specific businesses individually agreed to form 
the BID.67 Local business leaders believed that a stable and effective funding source would help 
with beautification and improvement, promote urban business areas, and ultimately allow them 
to regain market share.68 This organizational form has not changed substantially in the following 
45 years.69 A long, complex process must be followed in order for City Council to pass a bylaw 
designating a BID, including a formal public consultation meeting and the polling of BID 
members.70  
 
                                                        
65 Gerald E. Frug, “The Seduction of Form” (2010) 3:1 Drexel Law Review. 
66 City of Toronto, “Business Improvement Area (BID)” (2016) Board of Management Orientation Modules. 
67 Hoyt & Gopal-Agge, supra note 63 at 947. 
68 Pivot Legal Society v. Downtown Vancouver Business Improvement Association, [2012] at 26. 
69 City of Toronto, City of Toronto Municipal Code, s. 170-70. 
70 Ibid. at s. 19-4. 
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Map 1: BIDs in Toronto (Original research, 2016). 
 
Despite this cumbersome process, Toronto now has 82 BIDs, 43 of which were created after 
2000.71 Many are now located in industrial areas and suburbs outside of the downtown core.72  
They vary greatly in their levies, from thousands to millions of dollars.73 They also differ based 
on their year of origin and size. BIDs are also distributed unevenly across Toronto, with different 
kinds of businesses. Overall, BIDs represent only 36.1% of businesses in the city, as illustrated 
in Map 1.74 The largest and wealthiest are located in downtown and central areas. The downtown 
and central section of the city, known as the Toronto-East York Community Council area, 
comprises less than a quarter of the city’s population, but has 59% of its BIDs. While Toronto-
East York continues to have the majority of new BIDs, with 27 having been created since 2000 
and five since 2010, its relative share of BIDs has declined since 2010. Map 2 illustrates the 
                                                        
71 Rebecca Melnyk, "BIDs drive ethnic retail neighbourhoods" (April 7, 2015) The Remi Network, online: 
<https://www.reminetwork.com/articles/BIDs-face-change-in-ethnic-retail-neighbourhoods/>. 
72 City of Toronto, “Board Governance Structure - Profiles - Agencies and Corporations” (2016) Business 
Improvement Areas at b. 
73 City of Toronto, 2014; City of Toronto, 2015. 
74 Invest Toronto, 2016; Toronto Association of Business Improvement Areas, 2015. 
  13 




Map 2: Map of BIAs and density (Original research, 2016). 
 
Municipal bylaws tell two conflicting stories about the legal status of BIDs. On one hand, they 
are defined as ‘local boards’ and are therefore subject to numerous operating requirements that 
include open meeting requirements and record keeping. The appointment of their members must 
follow the city’s public appointments policy. Directors and board members, including the local 
city councillor, must conduct their affairs in compliance with all applicable law and City 
policies, which include privacy legislation, conflict of interest requirements, and the public 
appointments policy.75 The requirements for creating a BIDs are detailed in the procedural bylaw 
and their funding is collected through the city’s formal levying authorities and coordinated 
through an office dedicated to supporting their operations. The levy is drawn from local 
businesses and then forwarded to the BID when its annual budget is approved by City Council. 
All members of the BID are legally obligated to pay the municipality their portion of the levy, 
                                                        
75 City of Toronto, City of Toronto Municipal Code s 19-15(K). 
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which is based on the assessment values of the individual and neighbourhood properties.76 BIDs 
are tasked with overseeing the improvement, beautification, and maintenance of municipally 
owned land, buildings, and structures in the BID beyond standard City levels.77 The City’s 
bureaucratic structure provides professional operational and administrative support to BIDs to 
ensure compliance with the Municipal Code and other relevant City policies.78 A BID office, 
operated out of the economic development department, also oversees partnership projects with 
BIDs, including a capital cost-share program for streetscape improvement projects, street 
beautification initiatives, and grants to upgrade the physical appearance of their buildings.79 
 
The second story involves BIDs as independent organizations representing their members within 
specific geographic boundaries. Toronto city councillors represent local interests at City Council. 
Ward councillors consult and are lobbied by numerous bodies advocating on behalf of residents, 
businesses, and other stakeholders, including BIDs, neighbourhood associations, and park 
associations, with varying degrees of formal connection to the city. Ward councillors have great 
discretion over many issues, including local planning, spending on local development, and 
bringing together the various representatives to resolve conflicts and initiate projects. Within this 
framework, BIDs – together with organizations like neighbourhood associations – are often 
privileged in terms of consultation and involvement in decision-making, especially in higher-
income areas, as shown in Map 3. Ward councillors play a key role in the creation of BIDs, 
stewarding the passing of bylaws needed for their creation and helping local businesses meet city 
requirements.80 Once established, BIDs are important participants in city planning decisions, and 
include councillors, staff, and city-paid consultants.81  
                                                        
76 Moreover, how do dominant groups leverage and rely on state power to further their economic interests??  And 
should that be a shared agenda with the state?? How complicit should the state be in the exclusion of less worthy 
common space users? 
77 City of Toronto, City of Toronto Municipal Code s 19. 
78 City of Toronto, “Board Governance Structure - Profiles - Agencies and Corporations” (2016) Business 
Improvement Areas at a. 
79 Ibid. 
80 [Name removed for review] 
81 Ibid. 
  15 
 
Map 3: BIAs, neighbourhood associations, and income levels (Original research, 2016).82 
 
In interviews I conducted for a larger project related to city governance,83 one senior staff 
member at the City of Toronto explained that BIDs are “self-funding, defiant entities that operate 
in neighbourhoods, they’re actually not really democratic. They’re self-governing within the 
boundaries defined.”84 A former city councillor similarly referred to these organizations as “tiny 
little cities” within their areas.85 The relevant laws reflect this account: once their creation is 
approved by City Council, BIDs operate largely independently, subject to having their budgets 
approved. Their boards make decisions on what activities and actions the BID will undertake, 
without review by city officials.  
 
Evaluating BIDs: Relationship to city government, inclusivity, and representation  
 
                                                        
82 Original research (Name removed for review). 
83 Note methodology 
84 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #1, City Clerk’s Office, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (18 
December 2015) – author conducted. 
85 Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #1, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (5 July 2016) – author 
conducted. 
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BIDs have been described as “institutions that manage or govern common urban resources.”86 
Their role is critical to understanding how they fit within the meaning of the urban commons.  
This section expands upon existing scholarship, focusing on the effects of BIDs in Toronto and 
elsewhere. Specifically, it explores three elements: the relationship of BIDs to city government, 
who they represent, and how they are accountable.  
 
Relationship to city government 
 
BIDs exacerbate the tension in the line between ‘public’ or ‘private’ governance. They are not 
simply private actors seeking additional power and do not fit easily within particular descriptions 
as exclusionary or inequality-enhancing:87 they are complex organizations that defy easy 
categorization.88 For example, some studies have found that BID administrators do not consider 
the organizations governmental institutions, but rather part of the private sector.89 Wolf argued 
that BIDs are “a part of urban governance and public administration,”90 and that BIDs must be 
placed within the public administration context, even if their objectives focus on the ‘private’ 
concerns of their members. Richard Briffault noted that the ‘public’ and ‘private’ spheres are 
interconnected as a result of the taxation model that creates BID funding: “BIDs are created by 
public governments in a process in which their boundaries, programs, finances and governance 
structures are shaped by government decisions.”91 Some scholars have concluded that BIDs are a 
form of neoliberal management meant to compensate for declining public resources in 
increasingly privatized economies with an ethos of low taxation in an era of “if you want it, 
you’re going to have to fund it yourself.”92  
 
                                                        
86 Ibid at 289. 
87 Randy Lippert, “Urban Revitalization, Security, and Knowledge Transfer: The Case of Broken Windows and 
Kiddie Bars” (2007) 22 Can. J. Law Soc. 29. 
88 Poul F Kjaer, ‘From the Private to the Public to the Private – Historicizing the Evolution of Public and Private 
Authority’ (2018) 25 Indiana J Global Legal Studies 13. 
89 J.F., Wolf, (2006). “Urban Governance and Business Improvement Districts: The Washington, DC BIDs”(2006) 
29:2-3 International Journal of Public Administration 53 at 70) 
90 Ibid. at 74. 
91 Richard Briffault, “A Government for Our Time? Business Improvement Districts and Urban Governance”, 
(1999) 99:2 Columbia Law Review 365 at 471. 
92 Nathaniel M. Lewis, “Grappling with Governance: The Emergence of Business Improvement Districts in a 
National Capital” (2010) 46:2 Urban Affairs Review 180 at 187. 
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In practice, BIDs and local governments can have a highly cooperative relationship, operating 
almost like a public–private partnership; in other contexts, the BID may function exclusively as a 
private sector initiative. Most BIDs provide services and programs that would ordinarily be the 
responsibility of municipal governments, like security, sanitation, physical improvements, 
beautification, social services, and business-oriented programs.93 Some BIDs also play a 
substantially more proactive role in local governance and administration by establishing policy 
partnerships with local governments.94 Nathaniel Lewis found that as BIDs become service 
providers, development brokers and place makers, there is a corresponding retreat of municipal 
government.95 In Canada, the United States, and New Zealand, BIDs commonly offer consumer 
marketing, often through community events. Functions may also differ based on size: a study of 
BIDs in New York found that smaller organizations focus on physical maintenance, mid-sized 
BIDs focus on marketing and promotional activities, and large BIDs take care of a massive range 
of activities, including capital improvements.96  
 
Hamill noted that the privileged status of local business improvement bodies ultimately implies 
greater property rights, because such bodies are given the opportunity to lobby governments for 
modifications to adjacent common property in a way that no other private property holder is 
entitled to do.97 In this way, BIDs may also serve as lobby organizations for business interests, 
which have enhanced access to the city government. However, Foster and Iaione argued that 
BIDs are examples of the urban commons in that they allow a collection of public and private 
actors to manage public resources within a nested governance structure.98  For example, one of 
the largest BIDs in Toronto is the Toronto Entertainment BID. It was created in 2008 and 
straddles two electoral districts due to its large size (156 city blocks). It represents more than 
                                                        
93 Julia Wilder, “Note: But in Detroit? Business Improvement Districts and the Business of Improving Detroit: 
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1800 businesses and its 2016 budget was more than two million dollars (CAD). In 2013, it 
funded a Master Plan drafted by consultants, setting out in more than 100 pages the BID’s 
proposals for the public realm, focusing on details such as streetscaping, planters, cycling lanes 
and other matters that fall within the jurisdiction of the City of Toronto.99 With regard to any city 
proposals relating to the BID area, the Master Plan outlines in what circumstances the BID 
should provide “official written endorsements,” only where “the BID is assured that the spirit 
and intent of the Master Plan are respected.” It proposes a set process for councillor and staff 
review of the Master Plan in connection with proposed developments. The Master Plan further 
states that, “Where proposals are deemed to be fundamentally at odds with the spirit and intent of 
the Master Plan, the BID reserves its right to voice its opposition to the application to the City 
and/or Ontario Municipal Board.”100 
 
Previous research on BIDs in Toronto has revealed the difficulty in categorizing them. In his 
study of the development of the “creative city” within the Entertainment BID, Sébastien Darchen 
found that the BID had a strong voice in community deliberations and that its interests were 
specific to advantages for the member businesses.101 While council ultimately supported a 
mixed-use neighbourhood with a more diverse range of economic activities than those proposed 
by the BID, Darchen concluded that the promotion of arts and culture as imagined by the BID 
led to revitalization of the area.102 Another study of BIDs revealed that BIDs shape boundaries, 
market neighbourhoods, and affect governance overall.103  
 
The privileged role of BIDs in urban governance increases over time. A comprehensive study of 
BIDs in Center City, Pennsylvania evaluated the role of BIDs in urban governance. It revealed 
                                                        
99 The Planning Partnership, “Toronto Entertainment District BID Master Plan” (2015) 1, online: 
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that BID directors play a profoundly important role in urban governance, and that their 
involvement in the city’s governance became “deeper and wider” over the years. In particular, 
BID directors began to advocate on positions that went beyond the BID to citywide matters such 
as land-use planning, zoning, and intergovernmental funding for infrastructure repair.104 This 
kind of organizational longevity appears to apply to Toronto as well: a study of Toronto’s 
Downtown Yonge BID revealed that its objectives tended to evolve from basic operational and 




Susanna Schaller and Gabriella Modan argued that BIDs fundamentally increase space-related 
tensions.106 This tension is especially prevalent in economically and ethnically mixed 
neighbourhoods, where they can have the same kinds of impacts as in communities being subject 
to gentrification. Schaller and Modan noted that, “In such neighborhoods, it is very often the case 
that the constituents who are marginalized from the public decision-making process are the same 
people who are most vulnerable to changes in the housing market. As rents and property taxes 
increase, the residents who were ostensibly to benefit from such innovations may be displaced 
from the neighborhood, and the democratic spaces of interaction where social networks are 
created and maintained may disappear.”107 Another study found that BIDs insulate development 
decisions from communities and neighbourhoods.108 It also found that BIDs do not engage in 
neighbourhood advocacy or government–business relations, but instead focus on entertainment 
and high-rent housing, with minimal attention to the interests of existing residents, with 
“profound implications for notions of spatial and social justice.”109  
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Legal and anecdotal evidence suggests that BIDs make decisions that expressly undermine 
inclusivity.110 A poignant example is Los Angeles, where four separate cases have been brought 
against the City and its BIDs for confiscating the property of homeless people, despite clear 
jurisprudence preventing this.111 These unlawful seizures appeared to be random occurrences 
while homeless people were at missions and downtown shelters getting food and services, with 
items like tents, bedding, identification, and medications being seized.112 A permanent injunction 
has been ordered against the City of Los Angeles, enjoining it not to confiscate and destroy 
personal property that does not appear abandoned without notice.113 The plaintiffs allege that the 
City of Los Angeles “acts in concert with the BID to identify property to be removed and to 
ensure that the removals were not stopped or hindered.”114 In 2015, Toronto’s Chinatown BID 
objected to a plan to introduce a youth homeless shelter within the boundaries of the BID.115 The 
BID noted a lack of consultation on the proposal and possible negative effects on the area, 
stating: “the BID had worked hard for a decade to “clean up” the area, and business owners are 
worried the facility will turn Spadina into a “centre of homelessness.”116 The protest culminated 
in placards within member businesses, as well as a demonstration at City Hall.117  
 
Representation is a major element of these space-based tensions, specifically in relation to the 
composition and mandates of BID boards. At present, residents have few, if any, representative 
votes on BID boards.118 The board composition concentrates power among property and business 
owners, restricting the scope of representation.119 This framework reinforces political dynamics 
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that exclude marginalized and low-income residents, as well as small businesses.120 Some 
scholars have advocated for changing the composition of BID boards. For example, Schaller and 
Modan noted that individual claims over neighbourhood space are greatly influenced by 
immigration status, property ownership, class, and duration of residency in the community, and 
argued that city officials should ensure that any BID includes community members.121 They 
argued that including neighbourhood residents would ultimately not lead to a shift in power away 
from businesses and property owners, because the other BID members would ultimately carry 




In this context, accountability refers to the degree to which BIDs operate with openness and 
fairness, and especially the degree to which they are subject to the same transparency and 
accountability requirements as other public bodies.122  Briffault noted that BIDs are 
“autonomous, even though subjected to municipal oversight in theory.”123 He defined 
accountability in terms of reporting requirements to public officials, making a BID accountable 
to its board, the business community that it represents, city council, and the public.124 City 
governments may implement measures such as annual reports, outside audits, and sunset and 
reauthorization requirements. The rationale for these mechanisms is to ensure continuous 
evaluation of BID performance and to give power to municipal governments if BIDs are 
overstepping their authorities, although others argue that they are pro forma and after the fact.125 
In a popular newspaper, Ian Cook stated that BIDs may claim accountability to the public 
through their links to city council, but “ultimately BIDs are not really accountable to the public 
in general and are more focused on being accountable – of sorts – to businesses.”126 
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Some scholars have argued that the design of BIDs limits the degree to which they can ever be 
accountable. According to Wayne Batchis, Supreme Court jurisprudence has constitutionally 
permitted municipal fragmentation, inequality, and privatization in the United States, all of 
which made BIDs an essential tool for urban success.127 This ‘success’ ultimately allows BIDs to 
achieve their goals by eliminating the “messiness” of democracy,128 and the price of this process 
is to allow what has been conceived as “public” to become incrementally more “private.”129 One 
example is the accountability of BIDs in relation to public safety.130 A study of street vendors in 
New York revealed the extent to which BIDs use strategies such as public realm design (e.g., 
planters), collaboration with police, surveillance techniques, and even harassment to limit street 
vending (which is largely illegal) within their boundaries.131 These techniques are highly 
successful, and the landscape of street vending reflects the “decentralized, privatized and 
informalized vending management” of BIDs, rather than formal laws.132  
 
The City of Toronto manages accountability issues through various laws and policies, principally 
the Code of Conduct for Members of Local Boards, which sets out the requirements of BIDs and 
other local boards in the city.133 They specify that members may not accept a fee, advance, gift or 
personal benefit that is connected directly or indirectly with the performance of his or her duties 
of office; may not disclose confidential information unless required by law; may not use City or 
BID land, facilities, equipment, supplies, services, staff or other resources for activities other 
than the business of the local board or the City; must improperly use their influence; and must 
not lobby public office holders without following the Lobbyist Code of Conduct. If BID board 
members are found to have breached the Code of Conduct for Members of Local Boards, the 
city’s Integrity Commissioner may also recommend that Council or the BID may remove 
members of BID board members, among other sanctions.134 Thus, accountability requirements 
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may effectively regulate BIDs as organizations, yet fail to capture the broader community effects 
of BID actions. 
 
This brief review of relevant literature related to governance shows that, in their existing design, 
BIDs have significant decision-making power in local geographies of the city and represent BID 
members rather than the broader local public. Accountability provisions may not safeguard the 
effects of BID activities on the public, particularly the most vulnerable. BIDs may be viewed in 
two different ways: as an independent organization or as a formal actor in local governance. 
What if BIDs could be conceptualized as one part of a broader commons?  
 
BIDs and the urban commons framework 
 
The legal and social problems identified in BID governance – representation, accountability, and 
an uncertain relationship with city governments – reflect the challenges of BIDs within a broader 
system of local governance. Ultimately, the interests of BIDs reflect those of a privileged subset 
that has considerable power in local governance without democratic legitimacy or strenuous 
accountability. Any discussion of the urban commons should include issues related to power: a 
devolution of responsibility and power to organizations like BIDs may ultimately exacerbate the 
very sense of belonging that advocates of the urban commons seek to foster. According to 
Ostrom, the urban commons is a matter of collaborative governance. However, urban 
governance arrangements are generally voluntary and bind only those actually involved in the 
governance scheme. Such arrangements can have effects for many, beyond the actors that are 
specifically involved: “[I]n the case of urban commons governance institutions the governance 
arrangement may affect the everyday life of all city inhabitants that fall within the boundaries of 
the governance scheme (think of the BIDs, the decisions of which can have an impact also on 
those who are not part of the BID governance).”135 Foster and Iaione acknowledged that the 
bodies that are sharing governance authority may further inequality amongst residents.136 They 
stressed the need for questions of accountability and legitimacy to be “raised and constantly 
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invoked” when querying collaborate governance in the urban commons.”137 As Parker and 
Schmidt wrote, “The urban commons perspective may also underplay the role of government in 
deliberately creating shared urban resources and in selecting and enabling particular groups.”138  
 
BIDs deserve particular scrutiny in terms of their role within the urban commons framework. On 
one hand, they are woven into city administration through the existence of a dedicated office, an 
approved budget, and accessible information on how they may be contacted. This suggests that 
they are like any other local board of the City, with the responsibility to deliver a set of services 
and accountability with regard to how they use their funds. On the other hand, in local planning 
and other debates, they act as a privileged interest group to be consulted. This dual role creates 
confusion as to what role they serve (local boards or interest groups?) and to whom they are 
accountable (to the public or their members?). This confusion and narrow set of interests 
ultimately undermine the urban commons by depleting the ‘common pool interest’ – the 
democratic legitimacy of the local area. 
 
The debates about the urban commons explored above – the site of the commons as the city as a 
whole or a smaller geographic area; whether the resource is owned or not; and how decision-
making is mediated – illustrate the uneasy nesting of BIDs as an example of the urban commons. 
The ‘common pool resource’ engaged in BIDs is the spatial area defined by city bylaws. 
However, the spaces are not simply those that belong to business and property owners, but 
include ‘public’ areas like sidewalks and street furniture, and may include residential areas above 
or adjacent to storefronts.139 Thus, the resource interest is shared among a diverse set of property 
holders: BID members, but also a broader range of residents and the public. Non-property 
owners have a stake in the area in question, however, these broader interests are not reflected in 
the BID governance model.140 Moreover, this ‘common pool resource’ is also subject to many 
city policies and bylaws, with numerous other parties asserting interest in the same spaces, 
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including elected officials and organizations such as neighbourhood associations.141 In many 
sites, there is no evidence that ‘regulatory slippage’ has occurred in BID areas such that the 
common resource has degraded based on measures like quality of life. Indeed, BID areas in 
Toronto are generally located in the most affluent areas of the city. Rather than municipal 
institutions and land use regulations seeking to balance the competing interests of those in the 
area, it may well be that the BID is focusing on augmenting a single slippage: the profitability of 
member businesses.142  
 
Conceptualizing BIDs as an example of an urban commons has significant limitations. The 
‘regulatory slipping’ in question is not necessarily the degradation of the resource (for example, 
the city street) as identified by Hardin, where the resource becomes prone to destruction. Instead, 
the regulatory slippage is reflected in the erosion of openness and participation in city-making, 
caused by a focus on narrow interests to the detriment of a broader population.143 American 
scholar Richard Schragger challenged local decision-making on the basis that it may have 
negative implications for historically disenfranchised groups.144 He demonstrated that local 
institutions can easily become instruments for the private management of civic life, captured by 
powerful interest groups enforcing “a particular conception of public life to the exclusion of 
other competing conceptions.”145  
 
I suggest that BIDs should not be conceptualized as an example of the urban commons. Doing so 
undermines the strength and importance of the ‘urban commons’ as a conceptual and legal tool 
in reimagining city governance. The common pool resource – city spaces – must be governed by 
a broader range of interests. The BID should be one of many actors with a stake in what Foster 
and Iaione called “a visible, equal, contestable, and legitimate manner.”146 Scholars have 
proposed various ways of encouraging involvement, including charrettes,147 opportunities for 
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deliberative participation,148  and community-level institutions grounded in group-based 
“differentiated solidarity.”149 I agree with Foster and Iaione’s statement that “thinking of the city 
as an institution that promotes collaboration all the way across and down as a way to ‘share’ the 
resources it controls can spur a host of innovative and progressive policies that address the social 
and economic inequality that is becoming a feature of 21st century urbanization.”150  
 
Understanding the BID as one player among many in urban governance reframes the BID as 
only one of many interests, with an urgent call for a more thoughtful, inclusive, and 
representative local governance model. City governments, and especially councillors, must 
acknowledge the narrow interests that BIDs represent by reducing the extent to which they can 
exert decision-making power. This would help achieve Gerald Frug’s vision for a healthy 
community, “transformed from a concrete source of normative regulation to a loose 
confederation joined by common symbols, sights, and spaces, an artifact of subjective 




The urban commons is not merely about rights and who has what interest in the standard 
‘bundle’ language that property law asserts. In a city, it is also about a meaningful governance 
model that permits residents, businesses’ and other key stakeholders to have a say and a role over 
what happens in local spaces. This conception of the urban commons causes conflict when 
considered in relation to BIDs, which have a conflicting identity as both an independent 
organization and as part of the city’s governance framework. This paper advances that, instead of 
framing BIDs as an example of the urban commons, scholars may adopt a broader, messier 
notion of local governance that incorporates multiple voices, including BIDs, in a visible, equal, 
and legitimate manner.  
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